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Abstract
Data privacy is unarguably of extreme importance.
Nonetheless, there exist various daunting challenges to safe-
guarding data privacy. These challenges stem from the fact
that data owners have little control over their data once it
has transgressed their local storage and been managed by
third parties whose trustworthiness is questionable at times.
Our work seeks to enhance data privacy by constructing a
self- expiring data capsule. Sensitive data is encapsulated
into a capsule which is associated with an access policy and
expiring condition. The former indicates eligibility of func-
tions that can access the data, and the latter dictates when
the data should become inaccessible to anyone, including
the previously eligible functions. Access to the data cap-
sule, as well as its dismantling once the expiring condition
is met, are governed by a committee of independent and
mutually distrusting nodes. The pivotal contribution of our
work is an integration of hardware primitive, state machine
replication and threshold secret sharing in the design of the
self-expiring data encapsulation framework. We implement
the proposed framework in a system called TEEKAP. Our
empirical experiments conducted on a realistic deployment
setting with the access control committee spanning across
four geographical regions reveal that TEEKAP can process
access requests at scale with sub-second latency.
1. INTRODUCTION
Data privacy has always been a great topic of interest, and
it is even more so in the wake of recent devastating data
breach incidents reported to have far-reaching and serious
implications on both individual and institutional levels [2,
7, 9]. Protecting data privacy, nonetheless, faces with var-
ious daunting challenges, as data owners have little control
over their data once it has transgressed their local storage.
For instance, in the context of cloud services, personal and
sensitive data are typically collected, stored, processed and
archived by third parties whose trustworthiness are ques-
tionable at times (e.g., Facebook data scandal [2]). In an-
other example, social factors ranging from individuals’ care-
lessness to courts’ jurisdictional actions increase the likeli-
hood of private data being disclosed against the will of data
owners.
We seek to enhance data privacy by empowering the data
owners with more control over their sensitive data. We focus
on two properties, namely access eligibility, and data expiry.
The first property demands that only selected functions with
well-defined eligibility can access and compute on the sensi-
tive data. The access control structure must be able to attest
the eligibility of the requesting functions and the assurance
that such functions, once attested, do not deviate from their
intended behaviours. The second property ties the sensi-
tive data to an expiring condition. Once such condition is
met, the data is rendered inaccessible by any party (includ-
ing the previously eligible functions) without explicit action
from the data owners, parties who archive that data, or any
trusted third party or external service. More specifically, it
is required that the data becomes unattainable permanently
once it is expired in an autonomous manner. This calls for
decentralization and autonomy of the expiry mechanism. At
the same time, it is also necessary to ensure that the eligible
functions accessing the data prior to its expiration do not
leak it to any unintended entity, nor persist a copy of the
data on their storage. In order words, we aim to construct a
self-expiring data capsule whose content (i.e., the sensitive
data) is accessible to a selected eligible functions prior to its
expiry, and to none after its expiry.
We envision that the data encapsulation mechanism de-
scribed above would be beneficial to privacy protection of
a broad range of applications that involve digital content.
In fact, various applications have adopted the use of expir-
ing/disappearing data objects, for instances Snapchat1 and
Instagram2. In these applications, messages or stories disap-
pear after a predefined time window without any action from
the end users. Nonetheless, such disappearance are not au-
tonomous, instead triggered by a centralised service provider
whose trustworthiness may be questionable at times. This
is not desirable, for the service provider becomes a single-
point-of-failure. Another example is self-destruct chip [1].
Such a chip can be used to store sensitive data, and can
be triggered remotely to shatter into smithereens such that
reconstruction is impossible. However, the shattering is not
autonomous, but requires explicit invocation. We elaborate
on different use-cases and the needs of self-expiring data
capsule in Section 3.1.
Mechanisms for self-expiring data capsule without explicit
invocations have been studied previously [24, 44]. In a nut-
shell, these approaches create a data capsule by encrypting
the data that needs protecting with a randomly generated
encryption key, and secret-shares [37] the key to random
nodes in a decentralized Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [26].
The self-expiring property is realized by the fact that nodes
in DHT constantly churn or internally cleanse themselves.
This results in shares of the encryption key naturally vanish-
ing overtime, thereby rendering the protected data (which
is encrypted) inaccessible. These approaches, however, base
the expiring condition of the protected data only in form of
timeouts, and do not generalize to other type of condition
1https://www.snapchat.com/
2https://www.instagram.com/
(e.g., number of times the data has been accessed). Further-
more, they require parties that have legitimate access to the
protected data prior to its expiry to trust each other in a
sense that none of them will intentionally leak or perma-
nently preserve the plaintext copy of the encapsulated data
via out-of-band means. Designing a self-expiring data cap-
sule that does not observe the aforementioned limitations
remains technically challenging.
This paper presents TEEKAP - a framework for self-
expiring data capsule that sidesteps the limitations de-
scribed earlier. TEEKAP supports generic and flexible
user-defined access policy and expiring conditions, enforc-
ing data expiry even against parties that are eligible to ac-
cess the data prior to its expiry. The pivotal contribution
of our work is an integration of hardware primitives, state
machine replication and secret-sharing protocol. Intuitively,
TEEKAP comprises a committee of independent and mutu-
ally distrusting nodes that leverage a consensus protocol [35]
and secret sharing scheme [37] to collectively enforce the
access control and expiry criteria dictated by data owners.
This eliminates the single-point-of-failure issue.
In order to encapsulate her sensitive data with regard
to a certain expiring condition, the data owner first en-
crypts her data using a randomly generated encryption key.
She then divides this encryption key into shares (e.g., us-
ing Shamir secret-sharing [37]). Subsequently, she deposits
the shares and the access policy (e.g., which function can ac-
cess the data, together with the expiring condition) to nodes
in the access control committee. To ensure the security of
TEEKAP it is crucial that committee members preserve
the confidentiality of the shares assigned to them, as well
as consistency of the availability status of the encapsulated
data with regard to the expiring condition. For instance,
if the expiring condition is based on the number of times
the data has been accessed, the committee members should
agree on the access history, thereby agreeing on the avail-
ability status of the data. To establish such an agreement,
committee members in TEEKAP relies on consensus pro-
tocol to ensure their view of the data’s availability status
converge.
Any party that wishes to access the encapsulated
data must first provision a trusted execution environment
(TEE) [40] and attest the correct instantiation of the TEE
to the access control committee [12]. The committee mem-
bers then collectively verify the eligibility of the request, as
well as the availability of the protected data with regard to
the predefined expiring condition. If the expiring condition
has been met, the nodes discard the key shares assigned to
them, and rejects the request. On the other hand, if the
access can be granted, the committee members pool their
key shares to reconstruct the encryption key. It is crucial
that the reconstruction of the encryption key must be per-
formed securely so that the confidentiality of the key shares
are preserved, and none of the nodes in the access control
committee can obtain the encryption key intact. Once con-
structed, the key is delivered to the TEE of the requesting
party. The protected data is decrypted and processed exclu-
sively inside the requester’s TEE. The TEE guarantees that
the encryption key is discarded there after, and no copy of
the encryption key nor the plaintext version of the protected
data is persisted outside of the TEE.
We implement a prototype of our proposed framework us-
ing Intel SGX processors [32] and SGX SDK [3], and em-
pirically evaluate its performance in a realistic deployment
settings. Our experiments show that an access control com-
mittee spanning over four separate geographical regions in
TEEKAP can process access request at scale in real-time,
incurring sub-second latency.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We describe principle specifications and requirements
for self-expiring data encapsulation that supports
generic and flexible user-defined expiring conditions.
• We elaborate on the technical challenges of designing
the self-expiring data encapsulation by surveying can-
didate approaches and pointing out their limitations.
• We present our framework called TEEKAP that ad-
dresses the technical challenges and attains the de-
sired requirements. The pivotal contribution underly-
ing TEEKAP design is a unique integration of hard-
ware primitives, state machine replication and crypto-
graphic protocol.
• We implement a prototype of TEEKAP, conduct ex-
periments in realistic deployment setting and empiri-
cally show the efficiency of our system.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give brief overview of the building
blocks that we employ in the designing of TEEKAP. Sec-
tion 2.1 describes Intel SGX which is a hardware primi-
tive we use to provision TEE. Section 2.2 characterizes key
essence of consensus protocols, while Section 2.3 provides
background on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
2.1 Intel SGX
Enclave Execution. Intel SGX [32] is a set of CPU exten-
sions available on modern Intel processors [4]. These CPU
extensions are designed to provide hardware-protected TEE
(or enclave) for generic computations. Intel SGX associates
each enclave process with a CPU-guarded address space (aka
enclave memory). The CPU prevents any foreign process
(i.e., non-enclave process) from accessing the enclave mem-
ory. The enclave is isolated from other enclaves concurrently
running on the same host, from the OS, and from other user
processes. Intel SGX allows paging for the enclave memory,
and the memory pages are encrypted under the processor’s
key prior to leaving the enclave. Enclaves cannot directly
execute OS-provided services such as I/O. They have to em-
ploy OCalls (i.e., calls that are executed by the enclave code
to transfer the control to non-enclave code) and ECalls (i.e.,
API for untrusted applications to transfer control into the
enclave) to facilitate those services.
Attestation. Intel SGX’s attestation mechanisms [12] en-
able a validator to verify if an enclave in question is in-
stantiated with the correct code. At the same time, these
mechanisms provide means via which the validator and the
attesting enclave can establish a secure, authenticated chan-
nel to communicate sensitive or private data.
If the validator is another enclave instantiated on the same
platform (or host) with the attesting enclave, it can use lo-
cal attestation to ascertain the correct instantiation of the
latter. More specifically, after the attesting enclave is initi-
ated, the processor produces its measurement (i.e., the hash
of its initial state), and then creates a message authenti-
cation code (MAC) of such measurement using a key that
can only be retrieved by the validating enclave. The mea-
surement of the attesting enclave and its MAC are sent to
the validating enclave for verification. On the other hand, if
the validator is a remote party, the processors signs the mea-
surement with its private key under the Enhance Privacy ID
(EPID) scheme [25] [12], generating a remote attestation. It
is worth noting that in the current SGX architecture, the
remote party obtaining the attestation cannot complete the
verification of such attestation by itself. Instead, it has to
rely on the Intel’s Attestation Service (IAS) to check if the
signature contained in the attestation [5] is valid. Once the
signature is validated, the validating party checks the mea-
surement value against a known value to make certain of the
correct instantiation of the attesting enclave.
Data sealing. Enclave memory is volatile. To persist their
private state to non-volatile storage, enclaves need to em-
ploy data sealing mechanism. Concretely, to seal its private
state or data to persistent storage, the enclave first obtains
a unique key that is bound to its measurement from the pro-
cessor. Subsequently, it encrypts the data using the enclave-
specific key, and offloads the encrypted data to the storage.
This data sealing mechanism guarantees that the sealed data
can only be retrieved by the enclave that sealed it. However,
data sealing and retrieving is susceptible to rollback attacks
wherein an adversary (e.g., the malicious OS) presents the
enclave with properly sealed but stale data [14]. We refer
readers to [31] for defense against such rollback attack.
2.2 Consensus Protocols
In a distributed system comprising of independent and
mutually distrusting nodes, having the nodes agree on some
data that is crucial for the operation of the system is chal-
lenging, even more so in the presence of node failures. An
extensive body of research, especially on distributed con-
sensus protocols, has been dedicated to address a variety
of fault tolerance problems in distributed systems [35, 15].
There are two types of failures a node may undergo, namely
crash failure and Byzantine failure. The former character-
izes situation in which a node abruptly stop and does not
resume [35], while the latter, which is more disruptive in
comparison with the former, observes a faulty node deviat-
ing arbitrarily from its expected behaviors. For example,
a node experiencing Byzantine failure may equivocate (i.e.,
sending contradictory messages to other nodes), or it may
intentionally delay its activity for any period of time [15].
Consensus protocols are designed to achieve safety and
liveness in the presence of failures. Safety necessitates non-
faulty nodes to reach an agreement and never return con-
flicting results for the same query, whereas liveness requires
that these nodes eventually agree on a value. The rest of
this section focuses on a particular crash failure consensus
protocol called Raft [35].
Raft Consensus Protocol. Raft assumes a system of n
deterministic processes (or nodes), among which at most
f = n−1
2
could be faulty. A faulty process fails by crashing.
Each process stores a log that contains a series of commands,
or events of interest. Raft ensures that logs of non-faulty
processes contain the same sequence of commands, thereby
achieving safety even in asynchronous network (i.e., regard-
less of timing), and necessarily depends on timing to offer
liveness [22] (e.g., network is partially synchronous such that
messages are delivered within an unknown but finite bound).
Under Raft protocol, nodes assume one of the three roles,
namely leader, follower and candidate, and time is split into
terms numbered by consecutive integers. Each term marks
one node as the leader, while other nodes are followers.
The leader maintain its authority by periodically exchanging
heartbeats with all followers. Should a follower fail to hear
from the leader after an election timeout period, it shall con-
sider the leader crashed, increase its own term, undertaking
the candidate role and triggers an election. The candidate
claims itself as a leader once it has collected votes from a
majority of nodes. More detailed discussion on the leader
election and its election criteria can be found in Raft’s orig-
inal paper [35].
Followers respond to requests from the leader and can-
didate, and stay passive otherwise. All commands (e.g.,
clients’ requests) are sent to the leader, and subsequently
replicated on the followers. Given a command, the leader
first appends it as a new entry uniquely identified by the
leader’s term and an index to its log. It then announces the
entry to all followers. Upon receiving a new entry, followers
append it to their logs, and acknowledge the receipt with the
leader. After receiving the acknowledgement from a major-
ity of nodes in the system (i.e., f + 1 or more nodes), the
leader commits the entry by executing the command it con-
tains, as well as all preceding entries in its log if they have
not been committed. The leader keeps track of the highest
index committed, and convey this information to the follow-
ers in subsequent messages so as to inform the latter on the
committed entries.
While Raft assumes crash failure model, one can deploy it
in a Byzantine setting through the use of TEE [10, 18]. In
particular, adversarial behaviours of the faulty nodes can be
restricted by running the codebase of the consensus proto-
col inside the TEE with attested execution. This effectively
transform the Byzantine threat model to crash fault toler-
ance, in which Raft is applicable.
2.3 Threshold Secret Sharing
A threshold secret sharing scheme (e.g., Shamir’s Secret
Sharing [37]) is parameterized by two values, namely n and
t. The scheme preserves a secret S in a distributed man-
ner. More specifically, the secret S is split into n multiple
shares. To reconstruct the original secret S, one would need
a minimum number of shares. This number is the thresh-
old, and denoted by t. Any set of t or more shares can be
used to reconstruct the original secret S. The security of the
scheme dictates that no adversary that possesses knowledge
of any t − 1 or fewer shares could determine or reveal any
information about S.
Shamir’s Secret Sharing [37] works as follows. Given a
secret S, the threshold t and the number of shares n, wherein
t, n and S are elements in a finite field F of size P, 0 <
t ≤ n < P; S < P and P is a prime number, one can
secret share S as follows. First, let a0 = S, and choose
t−1 positive integers a1, . . . , at−1 at random such that ai <
P ∀i ∈ [1, t − 1]. Next, construct a polynomial f(x) =
a0 + a1x + a2x
2 + . . . + at−1x
t−1, and pick n points out of
form (j, f(j)) on f(x)’s graph. Every such point (plus the
knowledge of the prime number P defining the finite field F)
constitutes a share. Given the knowledge of any t or more
such points, one can evaluate the coefficients a0, a1, . . . , at−1
of f(x) using interpolation, and obtain the secret S from the
constant term a0.
3. THE PROBLEM
In this section, we characterize the self-expiring data en-
capsulation framework we seek, and challenges we must over-
come in provisioning one. We first discuss a few application
scenarios that motivate the needs of self-expiring data cap-
sules in Section 3.1. Next, Section 3.2 gives an overview
of the data encapsulation framework we study, while Sec-
tion 3.3 elaborates on the goals we aim to offer. Subse-
quently, Section 3.4 details the adversary model we con-
sider. Finally, we describe challenges faced in designing the
self-expiring data capsule by surveying candidate approaches
and pointing out their limitations in Section 3.5.
3.1 Use Cases
There exists physical implementation of expiring/disap-
pearing data object. Xerox PARC [1] introduced a chip that
self-destructs upon command. The chip can be used to store
sensitive data such as encryption keys. When there is a need
to dismantle the sensitive data, a command can be issued to
the chip, causing it to physically shatter into smithereens.
Once shattered, the chip cannot be reconstructed from the
smithereens, making the data irretrievable. However, the
destruction of the chip requires explicit invocation from the
chip owner.
Ephemeral messaging or social media services, such
as Snapchat and Instagram, feature expiring/disappearing
data object in their workflow. These applications typically
have a default “expiry condition” for messages sent or stories
posted by their users. Once such a condition becomes true
(e.g., after a Snapchat message has been seen, or 24 hours af-
ter an Instagram story is posted), these platforms render the
messages/stories inaccessible to the original intended view-
ers without any action from the users. Nevertheless, it is
unclear whether the content (e.g., messages and stories) is
completely deleted from the cache and storage systems of
the service providers.
Other applications could also take advantage of the self-
expiring data capsule. Consider private and event-specific
emails whose content is related to a distinct event and should
only be available to parties directly involved with that event.
Such emails may cease to have any value to the involved par-
ties after the associated event has come to pass. However,
email providers (e.g., Gmail or Yahoo) tend to store them
for an extended period of time (or even indefinitely) on their
servers, which gives rise to potential privacy risk wherein the
content of the email is revealed to unintended parties against
the will of senders (potentially due to mismanagement of
the email providers, or subpoena). For instance, during di-
alogue leading up to the actual incorporation of a company,
co-founders or stakeholders may have email exchange dis-
cussing different proposals with regard to the internal struc-
ture of the to be incorporated company, and these proposals
contain sensitive information that they wish not to disclose
to any outsider. Once they have reached a consensus and
finalized the company structure, the emails that contain dis-
regarded proposals no longer have any value, and the stake-
holders would prefer all copies of those emails to be auto-
matically deleted regardless of where they are cached and
stored rather than observing a risk of them being disclosed
to unintended parties. In such scenario, self-expiring email
capsule is clearly of great interest.
As yet another example, let us consider a group of credible
entities, such as hospitals, which are in possession of a large
corpus of sensitive and valuable data, in particular protected
health information and clinical records of their patients.
These data providers (i.e., hospitals) may be mutually dis-
trustful, and impose different privacy-protecting policies on
their data sets. However, they are willing to allow selected
clinical researchers to mine their data sets, for example to
facilitate the study of personalized treatment or to evaluate
their new findings, so long as the individual records are kept
private, and the mining adheres to their privacy-protecting
policies. The hospitals may employ privacy-preserving tech-
nique (e.g., differential privacy [21]) to sanitize the answers
given to queries submitted by the researchers. Without loss
of generality, we assume that such privacy-protecting poli-
cy/mechanism is associated with a privacy budget, and the
hospitals would like to render their data inaccessible to the
researchers once the privacy budget has been exhausted.
Moreover, the hospitals also want to restrict the type of com-
putations that the researchers can perform on their data set,
requiring the researchers to specify the specification of the
functions, and scrutinizing such functions before granting
them access to their protected data.
The examples discussed earlier observe a common trait.
That is, the data of interest is available for a particular set
of eligible parties and only for a limited duration until it is
expired, subject to a predefined access control policy. Once
the data is expired, it is no longer accessible by anyone,
including the previously eligible parties, any entity legiti-
mately or illicitly maintaining or caching its copies, and the
adversary.
3.2 Problem Overview
We focus on the deployment setting that comprises the
following main parties, namely data owner, encrypted stor-
age server, access control committee and access requester.
• Data Owners are in possession of sensitive and valu-
able data, and willing to allow scrutinized functions to
access their sensitive data. Such accesses must adhere
to access control and privacy protection requirements
imposed on the sensitive data. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that the sensitive data is encrypted
using semantically secure symmetric-key encryption
scheme [27], and its ciphertext (or capsule) is stored
on a public encrypted storage server (discussed below).
Access to the data is granted via the delivery of the
encryption key. The access control conditions cover
the eligibility of the functions, as well as the expir-
ing condition of the protected data. Once the data is
expired, it must be rendered inaccessible to anyone, in-
cluding the previously eligible functions. Nonetheless,
the data owners do not wish to upkeep the access con-
trol management on their own, but rather outsource it
to an access control committee (discussed below) that
is designed to be robust against single-point-of-failure
issues.
• Encrypted Storage Server is a key-value database
that stores the encrypted data. The generality of
the framework requires that its design is agnostic to
the implementation of the encrypted storage server
(e.g., RocksDB [8], LevelDB [6]). Interactions with the
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Figure 1: An overview of the interplay between the parties.
The data owner encrypts her data D under key k, obtaining
the ciphertext C. She then entrusts the key k and the access
control policy P to the access control (AC) committee, and
C to the encrypted storage server. The access requester
submits a request r to the AC committee, and obtains the
k if his function is eligible to access D per the policy P .
storage are distilled into two main functions, namely
store(k, v) which puts the data v indexed by the key
k onto the storage, and retrieve(k) which returns the
data indexed by k if it has been stored.
• Access Control Committee comprises independent
and mutually distrusting nodes that collectively en-
force the access control mechanism dictated by data
owners on the data capsules. The access control com-
mittee is a unique portal via which eligible functions
can obtain access to the protected data (i.e., its en-
cryption key). Given an access request, the nodes in
the committee collectively determine whether the re-
quested data has not been expired, and the request-
ing function is eligible for the access. If the data is
available, and the eligibility of the requesting function
checks out, the committee securely delivers the encryp-
tion key to the requesting function. We emphasize that
the eligibility in this context encompasses not only the
execution logic of the functions, but also the assurance
that they do not leak the sensitive data (in its plaintext
form) or its encryption key to any unintended party,
and do not persist plaintext copy of the data or the
encryption key on its storage.
• Access Requesters are those that wish to access the
protected data using specific functions (or programs).
It is required that such functions are executed inside
TEEs, and their measurement is known to the data
owners.
3.3 System Goals
This section enumerates the goals and properties that a
self-expiring data encapsulation framework must offer. The
resulting construction is expected to enhance privacy pro-
tection of numerous applications that involve digital content
without requiring explicit intervention of the data owners in
the upkeep of the access management.
• Generic expiring condition: The framework must
support generic expiring conditions (e.g., beyond sim-
ple timeout), giving the data owners flexibility in defin-
ing the expiration criteria of their protected data.
• Unavailability after expiration: An expired data
capsule can no longer be decrypted, and the protected
data remains inaccessible to anyone, including the pre-
viously eligible access requester and their scrutinized
functions as well as entities legitimately or illicitly
maintaining or caching copies of the data capsule re-
gardless of when they obtain such copies.
• Rigid access eligibility: Prior to the data capsule’s
expiration, the protected data can be made available to
eligible access requesters via their properly scrutinized
functions. It is important to stress that the access eli-
gibility is determined based on not only the function’s
execution logic, but also the assertion that such execu-
tion does not reveal the plaintext copy of the protected
data or its encryption key to any unintended party, nor
persist them in its storage.
• Autonomy: The access control operations (e.g., el-
igibility checking, data capsule expiration) should be
performed in an autonomous yet consistent manner by
the nodes in the committee. No explicit action from
the owners or parties who cache and archive the data
capsule are required.
• No-added attack vector: The self-expiring data
capsule must not expose any new attack vector on the
protected data in comparison to the baseline solution
wherein the data owners keep their data in private,
manually authorize every access request, and commu-
nicate the requested data to the eligible requester.
Let us revisit the example of protected health informa-
tion and clinical records mentioned in Section 3.1. Under
the setting described in Section 3.2, the hospitals play the
role of data owners, whereas the researchers are access re-
questers. Each hospital may encrypt its data corpus with
a unique encryption key, and may not share this key with
other hospitals. The encrypted health information and clin-
ical records can be placed on a publicly accessible storage.
The security of the encryption scheme in use assures that
no party can retrieve the clinical data in plaintext without
first obtaining the corresponding encryption key. Access to
the clinical data is granted via the delivery of the encryption
key. To ensure that the researchers will not deviate from the
intended and authorized computations to be conducted on
the clinical data, nor illicitly persist a copy of the clinical
data on their storage, the handling of the encryption keys
and processing of the protected data must be carried out
exclusively inside TEEs with attested execution.
In the absence of a secure self-expiring data encapsulation
framework, both the data owners and the access requesters
have to engage in involved and laborious processes. The
hospitals have to check the eligibility of each researcher re-
questing for data access and the availability status of the
requested data with respect to its privacy budget. Further-
more, they also need to verify the specification of the func-
tion as well as the correct instantiation of the corresponding
TEE. Besides, since different hospital encrypts their data
using different encryption key and observes different privacy
budget, a researcher who wishes to source data from multi-
ple hospitals has to send separate requests to the relevant
hospitals, and in some situation, has to await the coordina-
tion of the mutually distrusting hospital in granting access
to the requested data. This onerous practice clearly poses
too much burden on both parties, and hinders the scalability
of the system.
3.4 Assumptions and Adversary Model
In this section, we specify the trust assumptions as well as
the adversary model we consider in designing a self-expiring
data encapsulation framework that attains the desired prop-
erties and goals described in the previous section.
TEE Assumptions. As mentioned earlier, we require the
access requesters’ functions to be run inside TEEs with at-
tested execution. Our design assumes that the mechanism
which is used to provision the TEE (e.g., trusted processors
such as Intel SGX [32] or Sanctum [17] or Keystone [28])
is implemented and manufactured properly. Although our
work adopts Intel SGX processors to provision the TEEs, we
remark that our design is also compatible with other TEE
instantiations (e.g., TrustZone [11], Sanctum [17]). While
SGX enclaves admit side-channel and rollback attacks [43,
14], we note that both software and hardware techniques to
mitigate these attacks are presented in the literature [19, 31].
Incorporating defences against these attacks is orthogonal to
our work.
Access Control Committee Assumptions. Nodes in
the access control committee are independent and mutually
distrusting. Although the nodes may not trust each other,
they trust the codebase implementing the committees’ func-
tionality, which can be formally vetted and verified. In or-
der to prevent a malicious node to deviate from the trusted
codebase, we require every node in the committee to run
such a codebase inside a TEE featuring attested execution,
for instance enclaves provisioned by commodity Intel SGX-
enabled processors [4]. The nodes’ pairwise communication
is conducted via an authenticated and reliable point-to-point
communication channel, and no message is dropped. In the
absence of the adversary (discussed below), these channels
are synchronous (i.e., all messages are delivered within a
finite delay ∆ known a-priori). Let us denote by n the num-
ber of nodes in the committee. A node is considered faulty
if it crashes, or it cannot communicate with a quorum of
⌊n
2
⌋ nodes in a synchronous fashion. Let f be the number
of faulty nodes in the committee, we require f ≤ ⌊n−1
2
⌋ in
order for the committee’s operations to remain intact and
secure.
Threat Model. The main adversarial goal is to bypass
the protection mechanisms of the framework, gaining ille-
gitimate access to the plaintext copy of the protected data
even though it does not meet the access control conditions.
We study an adversary that can corrupt upto ⌊n−1
2
⌋ nodes
in the committee. It has full control over the compromised
nodes. It can corrupt or schedule all non-enclave processes,
including the node’s operating system (OS), and access their
memory content. Moreover, it can tamper with data per-
sisted on the compromised node’s storage. It can intercept,
read, modify, reorder and delay messages sent from and to
the compromised nodes. The adversary can also pose as an
access requester in an attempt to leak the plaintext copy
of the protected data. Alternatively, it can compromise an
otherwise benign access requester in the same way it can
compromise a node in the access control committee. Finally,
since the encrypted storage server is publicly accessible, we
assume that the adversary can retrieve any encrypted data
stored there.
Nonetheless, the adversary cannot violate protections
mechanisms provided by the SGX processors. More specif-
ically, it is unable to access runtime memory of an enclave,
or leak confidential information protected by the enclave ex-
ecution. The adversary does not have any access to the
SGX processor’s private keys which are utilized in attesta-
tion and data sealing [32]. The adversary is computation-
ally bounded, and it cannot break standard cryptographic
assumptions.
We assume the application codes running inside the TEEs
(e.g., the codebase implementing functional logic of the ac-
cess control committee, access requesters’ functions) can be
formally vetted and therefore trusted. We leave side-channel
attacks against the enclave execution [43] and Denial-of-
Service attacks against the system out of scope.
3.5 Challenges
Designing a data encapsulation framework that achieves
all the goals and features discussed in Section 3.3 is techni-
cally challenging. Let us consider a naive approach in which
the data owners manage access to their sensitive data by
themselves. While it can support generic expiring condition,
ensure unavailability of the protected data after expiration,
and guarantee rigid access eligibility, it requires intricate and
onerous involvement of the data owners. One may attempt
to unburden the data owners by introducing a dedicated
server that handles the key and access management on the
data owners behalf. Nonetheless, this solution suffers from
single-point-of-failure.
The dedicated server features enclave execution, and
maintains the encryption keys of data owners inside the en-
clave memory or on the server’s persistent storage using data
sealing [32]. Upon receiving an access request, it will first
check the availability status of the requested data, and the
eligibility of the requesting function (e.g., via remote attes-
tation). If all the requirements check out, the server securely
delivers the relevant encryption keys to the the TEE of the
function, thereby granting it access to the protected data.
The security of this approach essentially depends upon the
capability of the dedicated server (i) to prxeserve the con-
fidentiality of the encryption keys, (ii) to ensure the fresh-
ness of the availability status of the protected data, and
(iii) securing the execution integrity of the access control
management logic. While enclave execution provides strong
protection to (iii), attacks that compromise confidentiality
of enclave execution [43] threaten to breach (i), and roll-
back attacks [14] imperils (ii). In case the dedicated server
crashes indefinitely, the encryption keys are lost, causing the
data capsules to expire prematurely.
One may battle the single-point-of-failure using replicated
state machine. Instead of having one dedicated server, we
can rely on a committee of independent nodes to collectively
implement such logic. For instance, the availability status
of the protected data is replicated across all the nodes in the
committee, and determining whether the requested data has
been expired requires a consensus among the nodes. This
approach strengthens (ii), for it is arguably reasonable to as-
sume that launching a coordinated rollback attack on a set
of independent node is much harder than perpetrating the
attack on a single node. Nonetheless, care must be taken
to assure (i), since merely replicating the encryption keys
does not mitigate the threats posed by attacks against con-
fidentiality of enclave execution. As soon as the adversary
successfully extracts encryption keys from one of the nodes,
the security of the framework collapses.
4. THE TEEKAP DESIGN
We now present our self-expiring data encapsulation
framework, which we name TEEKAP. We first provide
key insights behind the design of TEEKAP in Section 4.1.
Next, we examine implementation alternatives, and anal-
yse their characteristics. Finally, we detail the workflow of
TEEKAP. We note that while our system adopts Intel SGX
to provision TEEs (or enclaves) with attested execution, the
underlying insight of TEEKAP is also applicable to other
TEE instantiations (e.g., Keystone [28], Sanctum [17]).
4.1 Key Insights
The security of our framework dictates that access to the
protected data is only granted to scrutinized functions of
eligible access requesters, that it is not leaked to any unin-
tended party, and that it becomes inaccessible to anyone, in-
cluding the previously eligible access requesters after its ex-
piration. In order to guarantee these properties, TEEKAP
needs to uphold the following two invariants:
1. Confidentiality of encryption keys: The encryption
keys that can be used to decrypt the protected data
(i.e., decapsulate the data capsule) must be kept pri-
vate (except for the data owner himself) at all time.
It is only revealed to the eligible function once the ac-
cess is granted. Further, it is important to ensure that
such function, once granted the encryption key, can
only use it inside the TEE, and does not persist the
key on its storage. Once the data capsule expires, the
corresponding encryption key must be eradicated.
2. Legitimacy of data accesses: Without loss of general-
ity, we can assume that each data capsule is associated
with an access log. An access requester and her func-
tion, if admitted to decapsulate the data capsule and
consume the protected data, must be first recorded in
its access log. In another word, the approval of an
access request is indicated by its corresponding entry
in the log. The expiring condition, and thereby the
availability status of a data capsule can be defined and
determined based on the access log. Consequently, in
order to ensure legitimacy of data accesses and enforce
proper expiration of the protected data, it is critical to
ensure the integrity and tamper resistance of the access
logs in the presence of adversary.
While it is convenient to have a dedicated server manages
the two invariants mentioned above, this approach is clearly
susceptible to single point of failures. A proven strategy to
sidestep such failures is to embrace decentralization. It is
worthy to note that decentralization goes beyond replica-
tion. As an example, splitting a secret into shares such that
a subset of these shares can be used to reconstruct a se-
cret, and depositing them to independent nodes offers better
protection to the confidentiality of the secret in comparison
with storing the said secret at one node. On the other hand,
replicating such secret at different independent nodes does
not offer any stronger confidentiality protection compared to
having only one node storing the secret, for compromising a
single node among them is sufficient to extract the secret.
As indicated above, a natural approach to decentralise a
secret is to adopt a secret-sharing scheme [37, 30]. Under a
(t, n)-secret sharing scheme, a secret S is split into n shares
given to n independent nodes. Any subset of t or more
shares can be used to reconstruct the secret, while individual
shares do not reveal any information about S. The adversary
must corrupt at least t nodes and obtains their shares in
order to leak the secret. The secret-sharing also enhances
robustness of the system against secret loss, for S is only
rendered unattainable when more than n− t shares are lost.
Our design takes advantage of secret sharing to strengthen
the protection of the encryption keys.
Besides preserving confidentiality of encryption keys, a
self-expiring data encapsulation framework needs also to en-
sure legitimacy of data accesses. In designing TEEKAP,
we observe an interesting analogy between a data capsule in
our context and a coin (e.g., Bitcoin) in the crypto-currency
context [33]. More specifically, while we want to guaran-
tee that only eligible function can access the protected data,
and that access is only possible while the data capsule has
not yet expired, a crypto-currency platform needs to ensure
that a coin can only be spent by its owner (e.g., to whom the
coin has been sent to previously), and the owner can only
spend that coin once. Under our framework, all accesses
to the protected data are recorded in its associated access
log, and the expiration status of the said data can be deter-
mined based on the content of the access log. Likewise, all
transactions that spend coins in the crypto-currency plat-
form are recorded in a ledger, and one can rely on such a
ledger to prevent double-spending. TEEKAP shares with
the crypto-currency platform a necessity of securing the in-
tegrity and tamper resistance of an append-only sequence
of data records. This very analogy suggests replicated state
machine [36] as a natural solution to safeguard the valid-
ity and incorruptibility of the access logs in our framework.
That is, the access logs are replicated across independent
nodes which run a distributed consensus protocol to assure
that their local copies of the logs converge even in the pres-
ence of the adversary or individual node failures.
4.2 Implementation Consideration
We have pointed out the two key invariants that
TEEKAP must afford, and described how decentralization
can be adopted to implement them. Nevertheless, there re-
mains a critical implementation choice to be determined.
The first alternative is to have a single committee of in-
dependent nodes handling both properties. On the other
hand, one could employ two separate, non-overlapping com-
mittees, each of which safeguards one invariant, provided
that their operations are properly coordinated. In what fol-
lows, we sketch an outline of each design choice and explore
its implications.
Two separate, non-overlapping committees. This de-
sign choice requires the involvement of two separate sets of
independent nodes. The first, which we call encryption-key-
committee (or EKComm), is tasked to protect the confiden-
tiality of the encryption keys via the use of secret-sharing.
The second set of nodes, dubbed access-log-committee (or
ALComm) is tasked to safeguard the validity and incorrupt-
ibility of the access logs associated with the data capsules.
It is needless to say that nodes in EKComm does not have per-
mission to write to the access logs, and nodes in ALComm does
not have any knowledge of the secret keys or their shares.
Having two separate committees allows greater flexibility
in configuring system and security parameters. For instance,
EKComm may comprise a large number of commodity nodes,
and the threshold used in the secret sharing is high (e.g.,
t = 2
3
n). Larger EKComm and higher threshold means the
adversary has to corrupt more nodes in order to extract
the encryption keys. On the other hand, ALComm can be
configured to consist of only a small number of nodes with
defense-in-depth mechanisms [23, 39] in place to better safe-
guard them against adversarial compromise. A small ALComm
is expected to yield higher throughput (i.e., the number of
access request the committee can process per unit of time),
for consensus protocols designed for permissioned settings
often favor small committee size [20]. One may also argue
that this design choice adheres to the principle of privilege
separation - a technique in which different parts of the sys-
tem are limited to specific privileges and tasks.
Nonetheless, the separation of EKComm and ALComm presents
challenges in coordinating the interactions between the ac-
cess requester R and the two committees. Recall that in
TEEKAP the approval of an access request is indicated
by its corresponding entry in the access log, and the ac-
cess is granted via the delivery of the encryption key. That
is, granting access to a data capsule is essentially a dis-
tributed and atomic transaction [38]. In our context, this
comprises two indivisible operations, one concerning EKComm
while the other involving ALComm. These two operations are
distributed in a sense that two committees responsible to
handle them are separate and independent.
A standard approach to ensure atomicity of a distributed
transaction is to adopt an atomic commitment protocol,
such as two-phase commit protocol (2PC) [13]. In a clas-
sic 2PC protocol, there is a coordinator and a set of par-
ticipants. The protocol starts by the coordinator querying
all participants if they can commit the transaction. Next,
the coordinator broadcasts a commit message if it receives a
vote yes from every participant, or an abort message oth-
erwise. When the participants receive the commit message,
they complete the transaction locally and responds the co-
ordinator with an acknowledgement. Alternatively, if they
receive the abort message, they will undo all operations re-
lated to the transaction in question, and revert to the initial
state (i.e., before they receive query to commit from the
coordinator).
One may apply 2PC protocol on the two committees
EKComm and ALComm as follows. Let the former serve as a
coordinator, while the latter be the participant. The access
requester R sends the request to EKComm, which then queries
ALComm for the eligibility of the request. If ALComm replies
EKComm with a vote yes, EKComm reconstructs the secret key,
and sends a commit message to ALComm. Upon receiving
the commit message, ALComm writes the entry correspond-
ing to the request to the access log, and replies EKComm with
an acknowledgement. Upon receiving the acknowledgement,
EKComm delivers the secret key to TEE of the requesting func-
tion.
The description above, however, oversimplifies many sub-
tle details. First, since EKComm and ALComm are collections of
nodes, operations such as ALComm replying to the query to
commit from EKComm, or EKComm sending a commitmessage to
ALComm entail nodes in the committees to complete one run of
the consensus protocol. Secondly, committee-to-committee
communication poses heavy stress on both the network and
the nodes when the committee sizes are large. As an alterna-
tive, one may also designate the access requester R as the co-
ordinator, and have both committees serve as participants.
Nonetheless, this is not ideal either, for the access requester
may fail permanently during the protocol execution, leaving
one or both of the committees blocked indefinitely [20].
Another possible workflow is to let the access requester R
interact with EKComm and ALComm in two stages. In the first
stage, a request is submitted to ALComm, which then verifies
the eligibility of the request. If the access can be granted,
ALComm confers the requester R’s function an access token T.
R then presents T to EKComm in order for its function to obtain
the relevant secret key. The reconstruction of the secret key
from the shares can be done by EKComm, or it shares can
be delivered to the function of R and reconstructed therein.
Regardless of where the key reconstruction is carried out,
it is important to prevent R from double-spend the access
token. This would requires nodes in EKComm to keep a ledger
of used access-tokens, and their ledgers must converge in
the presence of the adversary or individual node failures. In
other words, EKComm needs to adopt consensus protocol to
keep the nodes’ local copies of the ledger consistent. It is
also worth mentioning that if R crashes right after obtaining
the access token T (i.e., the access request is approved but R
never actually decapsulates the data capsule), the access log
maintained by ALComm may not reflect the actual usage of
the corresponding data capsule, which may leads to unjust
expiration.
One committee. We now explore a design choice in
which a single committee, called unified access-control-
committee (or UAComm), is tasked to uphold both invariants
of TEEKAP (i.e., confidentiality of encryption keys and
legitimacy of data accesses). As an overview, given a data
capsule DC with encryption key k, each node in UAComm keeps
a share of k and a replicated access log associated with DC.
When an access requester R submits a request to access DC,
nodes in UAComm collectively determine the eligibility of R’s
function, and the current expiration status of DC. If they
reach a consensus that the access can be granted, they pool
their shares together, reconstruct k, and securely deliver it
to the TEE of the requesting function.
Compared to the two-committee design choice, utilizing
a unified access control committee arguably puts more con-
straints on system and security parameter configurations.
In particular, the threshold t of the secret-sharing scheme is
set in accordance with the fault-tolerance threshold of the
consensus protocol in use. In addition, the choice of the
committee size becomes more delicate. A small committee
size enables UAComm to afford high throughput, but lowers
the robustness of the system against attack that aims to
illicitly extract the encryption keys. In contrast, a large
UAComm makes it more difficult for the adversary to obtain
the secret keys (as it has to compromise more nodes in or-
der to obtained the required shares), but may lessen the
the committee’s throughput due to higher communication
overhead [20].
Handling both the approval of the access request (i.e., its
corresponding entry is written into the access log of the data
capsule in question), and the reconstruction as well as the
delivery of the relevant encryption key, UAComm alleviates the
need of coordinating the interplay between these two opera-
tions, naturally ensuring atomicity of access granting. That
is, the access log associated with a data capsule DC correctly
reflects the sequence of accesses that have been granted (i.e.,
functions to which the encryption key has been delivered)3,
ensuring just expiration of DC. Moreover, this implementa-
tion requires UAComm to undertake only one consensus pro-
tocol run per each access request (we shall elaborate in the
next Section), which is more efficient and incurs lower la-
tency than the 2PC-based coordination between EKComm and
ALComm described in the design choice involving two separate,
non-overlapping committees.
Overlapping committees. Avid readers should have
thought of yet another implementation approach wherein
the access control committee comprises a large number of
nodes, but not all of them are responsible for handling the
data capsules’ access logs. In particular, given a data cap-
sule DC with encryption key k, each node in the committee
keeps a single share of k, but only a select few nodes are
tasked to maintain replicated copies of DC’s access log. In a
sense, this is equivalent to an implementation that engages
two committees, each of which defends one invariant, but
one committee is a strict subset of the other. We abuse the
notation and denote these two committees by EKComm′ and
ALComm′, then ALComm′ ⊂ EKComm′. More generally, let us
consider a settings in which ALComm′ may not be a subset of
EKComm′, but there exists a non-empty subset of nodes that
belong to both ALComm′ and EKComm′ (ALComm′∩EKComm′ 6= ∅).
Similar to the approach utilizing two non-overlapping
committees, this setting allows flexibility in configuring sys-
tem and security parameters. That is, one can configure
different committee size for EKComm′ and ALComm′, with large
EKComm′ enhancing the robustness of the committee in safe-
guarding the confidentiality of encryption keys, and small
ALComm′ yielding high throughput in processing processing
the replicated access logs. More interestingly, the inter-
section of EKComm′ and ALComm′ eases the coordination of
their operations with respect to an access request. In fact,
we believe that it is possible to extend the protocol design
constructed for UAComm (i.e., the approval of the access re-
quest and the reconstruction as well as the delivery of the
its encryption key to the approved function are merged into
a single protocol run) to support the interactions between
EKComm′ and ALComm′, albeit more protocol parameters and
convoluted protocol details. However, the aforementioned
flexibility in system configurations and ease of coordination
come at a price of complications in defining the threat model
governing EKComm′ and ALComm′, and reasoning about the se-
curity of the system with respect to such a threat model.
This is so because faulty nodes belonging to the intersection
of EKComm′ and ALComm′ may entail different security impli-
cations in comparison with those that do not belong to the
intersection. We leave this exploration to future work.
4.3 Protocol Details
Based on the above discussion of advantages and disad-
vantages of different implementation approaches, we decide
to leverage a single access control committee (denoted by
UAComm) in the implementation of TEEKAP. The commit-
3There exists a possibility wherein the function crashes im-
mediately after receiving the encryption key, and never actu-
ally decapsulates DC. Nonetheless, this is beyond the scope of
TEEKAP, which concerns only the granting of the accesses,
and does not attempt to check the actual consumption of the
relevant protected data by the approved function.
tee UAComm consists of n independent nodes 〈N1, N2, . . . , Nn.
Each node in UAComm is equipped with an Intel SGX-enabled
processor, and their execution is protected by the SGX en-
clave [32]. Our threat model (discussed in Section 3.4 as-
sumes that upto ⌊n−1
2
⌋ nodes in UAComm can be faulty or
compromised. A node fails by crashing. The adversary
has full control over the compromised nodes, but it can-
not break SGX protection mechanisms and standard crypto-
graphic assumptions. In the following, we present the work-
flow of TEEKAP, focusing on three key protocols, namely
Encapsulate by the data owner, RequestAccess by the
access requester, and ProcessRequest by UAComm.
Encapsulate. To encapsulate a data object D, the data
owner Downer follows these steps below:
1. Downer picks an encryption key k uniformly at random.
2. Downer encrypts D with k using a semantically secure
symmetric-key encryption scheme [27], obtaining a ci-
phertext C.
3. Downer uses (n, t) threshold secret sharing scheme [37]
to split the encryption key k into n shares (k1, k2,. . .,
kn), such that any set of t = ⌊
n+1
2
⌋ shares can be used
to reconstruct k.
4. Downer defines an access policy P associated with the
ciphertext C. P specifies the eligibility of the access
request and the expiration condition of C. The data
capsule DC of the data D comprises 〈C,P , t〉, and is
uniquely identifiable by the file handle DCID.
5. Downer entrusts DC to the encrypted storage server,
indexing it with DCID (i.e., store(DCID, DC)).
6. Downer sends 〈DCID, ki,P〉 to node Ni in the access
committee UAComm (1 ≤ i ≤ n) via a secure and au-
thenticated channel.
RequestAccess. When an access requester R wishes to
access the data capsule DC using a function F , she needs to
perform the following steps:
1. R instantiates the enclave that hosts F ’s execution.
The enclave instantiation generates a public-private
key pair (pk
F
, skF ) uniformly at random, which can
be used by a remote party to establish a secure and
authenticated communication channel with F enclave.
2. R obtains F ’s remote attestation piF = 〈MF ,pkF 〉σTEE
from the trusted processor. MF is the enclave’s mea-
surement, and σTEE is a group signature signed by the
processor’s private key under the EPID scheme [25]4.
3. R requests the Intel Attestation Service to verify piF ,
retrieving CertF = 〈piF , valid〉σIAS as a response.
CertF is a publicly verifiable certificate that proves
the correct instantiation of F enclave.
4. R sends a request of form r = 〈DCID, CertF 〉 to UAComm
(e.g., to the current leader of UAComm), and awaits for
4At the time of this writing, Intel attestation mechanism is
designed such that the only party that can verify piF is the
Intel Attestation Service (IAS) acting as group manager.
the approval and the delivery of DC’s encryption key
into the enclave F .
ProcessRequest. For a data capsule DC uniquely identi-
fiable by DCID, each node in UAComm maintains a replicated
access log that records a sequence of access requester and
her function admitted to decapsulate DC. The availability
status of DC can be determined based on P and the access
log. Therefore, a critical factor of ProcessRequest is to
ensure replicated access logs maintained by the independent
nodes converge. TEEKAP leverages a consensus protocol
named Raft [35] to ensure this convergence.
Raft is designed for crash failure model, whereas our
threat model assumes the adversary has full control over
compromised nodes. In order to extend Raft to our setting,
we require that each node in UAComm runs ProcessRequest
inside the enclave with attested execution. This effectively
restricts adversarial behaviours of the faulty nodes, thereby
reducing the threat model from Byzantine fault tolerance to
crash fault tolerance, to which Raft applies.
Following Raft, one node in UAComm is elected as a leader5,
while the others are followers. For clarity, let us denote the
leader as L. Upon receiving a request r = 〈DCID, CertF 〉
from an access requester, L coordinates the processing of
the request as follows:
1. L first verifies if CertF is indeed authenticated by the
IAS, if F is eligible to access the data capsule DC based
on DC’s access policy P , and if DC is still available. If
all these conditions check out, L proceeds to the next
step. Otherwise, it responds the access requester with
⊥, indicating access denial.
2. L puts an entry 〈DCID, CertF 〉 to its cache, and broad-
casts 〈DCID, CertF 〉 to all the followers.
3. Upon receiving 〈DCID, CertF 〉, a follower Ni performs
the same checks that L has done in step (1). If
all the conditions check out, Ni responds to L with
an acknowledgement and the key share it keeps (i.e.,
〈acki, DCID, ki〉). Next, it puts 〈DCID, CertF 〉 to its
cache.
4. Once the leader L has confirmed that 〈DCID, CertF 〉
has been replicated on a majority of the nodes in
UAComm, its adds CertF to the access log associated
with the data capsule DC. Once it has obtained suffi-
cient number of shares (i.e., t) to reconstruct the en-
cryption key k, it reproduces the encryption key k.
5. L then establishes a secure and authenticated com-
munication channel to F enclave (using pk
F
found in
CertF ), and delivers the encryption key k to the latter.
By this time, L has committed the access granting.
6. If granting F access to leads to the expiration of DC,
L discards its the encryption key share it keeps. The
leader announces the commit of the access granting in
the next message it exchanges with the followers.
7. Once a follower Ni sees the commit, it adds CertF to
its access log associated with the data capsule DC. If
5When the leader fails, it is replaced by a leader election pro-
tocol. We refer readers to [35] for details on leader election
and its election criteria.
this leads to the expiration of DC, Ni discards the share
ki assigned to it.
5. SECURITY ARGUMENTS
Since we intend our contributions to be pragmatic as op-
posed to theoretical, we provide in this section informal secu-
rity arguments of TEEKAP. These arguments justify how
TEEKAP attains the system goals presented in Section 3.3.
Our security arguments build on that of threshold secret
sharing scheme [37], Raft consensus protocol [35], and Intel
SGX enclave execution and its guarantees [32].
We first show that the access committee UAComm guaran-
tees rigid access eligibility. The eligibility of a function F is
asserted based on the publicly verifiable certificate CertF .
This certificate proves the correct instantiation of F . Given
the security guarantee of Intel SGX enclave execution and its
remote attestation mechanisms [12], nodes in UAComm can in-
dependently examine F ’s eligibility. The ProcessRequest
protocol follows Raft [35] to ensure that these nodes reach
a consensus on such an eligibility. It also ties this consensus
to the reconstruction of the required encryption key (i.e.,
acknowledgements sent by the followers contain their key
shares). This ensures only functions that are collectively
deemed as eligible may receive the encryption keys and ac-
cess to the requested data capsule.
Next, we discuss how ProcessRequest ensures unavail-
ability of data capsules after their expiration. Recall that the
expiring condition of a data capsule are determined based
on the access log, and that nodes in UAComm discard key
shares assigned to them as soon as there is an update to
the access log that leads to expiration of the data capsule
in question (i.e., step (6) and (7) of ProcessRequest ).
ProcessRequest follows Raft [35] to ensure that the repli-
cated access logs maintained by nodes in UAComm converge,
and that the key shares are collectively discarded upon ex-
piry. Disposing the encryption key effectively render the
corresponding data capsule unavailable thereafter.
It is worth noting that assuring unavailability of data cap-
sules after their expiration requires those functions that re-
trieved the encryption key before the capsules’ expiry do not
misuse the keys or the data. In particular, they must not
leak the protected data or its encryption key to any unin-
tended party, and do not persist the data on their storage.
This assurance is covered under the eligibility of the request-
ing function, which can be attested using SGX’s attestation
mechanisms [12].
From our description of ProcessRequest, it should be
clear that TEEKAP attains autonomy. All access control
operations and the expiration of the data capsule are han-
dled in a consistent manner by independent and mutually
distrusting nodes in the committee, without any explicit ac-
tion from the data owner. In addition, so long as the adver-
sary cannot violate our threat model (e.g., it cannot com-
promise for than ⌊n−1
2
⌋ nodes in UAComm, nor corrupt the
enclave execution mechanisms of Intel SGX), UAComm safe-
guards both the confidentiality of encryption keys and the
legitimacy of data accesses. In other words, TEEKAP does
not expose any new attack vector on the protected data in
comparison with the data owners handling the access control
on their own.
6. EVALUATION
Table 1: Latency (ms) between different regions on GCP.
Zone us-west1 us-west2 us-east1 us-east4
us-west1 0.0 24.7 66.7 59.0
us-west2 24.7 0.0 62.9 60.5
us-east1 66.7 62.9 0.0 12.7
us-east4 59.1 60.4 12.7 0.0
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Figure 2: Throughput of ProcessRequest with respect to
different access control committee size.
This section reports our experimental study of TEEKAP,
focusing on throughput and latency of ProcessRequest.
We conduct the experiments following two different settings.
In the first setting, we use an in-house (local) cluster con-
sisting of 35 servers, each equipped with Intel Xeon E3-1240
2.1GHz CPUs, 32GB RAM and 2TB hard drive. Each node
in the access control committee UAComm runs on a separate
server. The average communication latency between any
two nodes is 0.13ms. In the second setting, we run UAComm on
Google Cloud Platform (GCP), wherein each nodes is pro-
visioned using a separate instance with 2 vCPUs and 8GB
RAM. The nodes on GCP are distributed across four regions,
namely Los Angeles (us-west2), Oregon (us-west1), South
Carolina (us-east1) and North Virginia (us-east4). We de-
tail the average communication latency between nodes in
these regions in Table 1.
We leverage Intel SGX SDK [3] to implement the trusted
code base. We recorded the latency incurred by each SGX
operation on our local cluster’s CPU with SGX Enabled
BIOS support. Public key operations are expensive: sign-
ing and signature verification take roughly 450µs and 844µs,
respectively. Context switching and symmetric key opera-
tions take less than 5µs. Remote attestation, which involves
access to the IAS, takes about 250ms on average. For the
experiment on GCP, since Intel SGX is not available on the
platform, we need to configure the SDK to run in simula-
tion mode [3], and inject the SGX latency measured on our
local cluster into the simulation. Unless otherwise stated,
the results reported in the following are averaged over 20
independent runs.
Recall that ProcessRequest builds upon the Raft con-
sensus protocol [35]. One critical parameter to be set in
Raft is the timeout [35]. The timeout configuration neces-
sarily takes into consideration the communication latency
between nodes in UAComm. Our careful analysis indicates
that given an average communication latency of 0.13ms on
our local cluster, the timeout should be chosen uniformly at
random from the range [50− 150](ms). On GCP with com-
munication latency ranges from 24ms to 66ms, we observe
the optimal timeout range to be [150 − 250](ms).
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Figure 3: ProcessRequest latency with respect to differ-
ent access control committee size.
Figure 2 reports the throughput of UAComm (i.e., the num-
ber of requests it can process per unit of time). We observe
the correlation between the committee size and its through-
put. More specifically, as the committee grows, the through-
put drops. This is because larger committee leads to higher
communication overhead of the underlying consensus pro-
tocol and higher cost of reconstructing the encryption keys.
We also observe that throughput recorded on GCP is lower
than that on our local cluster. We attribute this to the dif-
ference in timeout configuration which is influenced by the
communication latency of each setting.
Figure 3 depicts latency incurred by ProcessRequest
with respect to different access control committee size
(denoted by n). Clearly, larger committee size leads
to higher latency. In particular, on our local cluster,
ProcessRequest latency is at 72ms when n = 5, which
increases to 119ms when n = 33. This is due to the over-
head of the underlying consensus protocol. Moreover, the
latency observed on GCP is much higher than that observed
on our local cluster. This is in keeping with the observation
we make on the throughput difference in Figure 2, wherein
the main factor contributing to the gap is the difference in
communication latency of the two settings.
7. RELATED WORK
The problem of self-expiring/self-destructing data cap-
sule has been explored in the literature [42, 24]. In these
works, the access policies and expiring conditions are mainly
based on timing control, whereas TEEKAP allows data
owners to define generic conditions. Xiong et al. proposed
FullPP [42], combining timed-release encryption [16] and
distributed hash table (DHT) to build a full life-cycle pri-
vacy protection scheme for sensitive data. In particular,
the sensitive data is first encrypted into a data-ciphertext.
The key that can be used to decrypt the said ciphertext is
then further encrypted into a key-ciphertex which is com-
bined with data-ciphertext to create ciphertext shares that
are distributed to the DHT network. This protocol ensures
that both the key and the ciphertext are destructed after ex-
piration time. Geambasu et al. also leverage DHT to build a
self-destructing data capsule scheme called Vanish [24]. Un-
like FullPP, Vanish only encrypts the sensitive data, splits
the encryption keys into shares and distribute them to the
DHT, without further encrypting the encryption key them-
selves or splitting the ciphertext into shares.
Standing in contrast to self-expiring data capsule is self-
emerging data storage and/or time release encryption. In
a nutshell, a sensitive data is encrypted and thus remains
unreadable until a predefined time in the future. Ning et
al. [34] proposed a construction that leverages threshold se-
cret sharing and smart contracts. More specifically, the se-
cret is divided into shares and entrusted to a group of in-
centivized participants, with rewards for punctual release of
the shares contractualized and enforced by the autonomous
smart contract. Li et al. developed a self-emerging data
storage wherein keys of encrypted data are given to nodes
in a DHT, and revealed only after a predetermined time by
routing the shares in a deterministic way [29]. Dragchute,
on the other hand, employs time-consuming computations
to incorporating timing control into the protocol [41].
8. CONCLUSION
We have presented TEEKAP, a framework for self-
expiring data capsule that supports rich and generic access
control policies and expiration conditions. The pivotal con-
tribution underlying our proposal is a unique integration of
hardware primitives (i.e., Intel SGX), state machine replica-
tion and threshold secret sharing in the design of TEEKAP.
We conduct empirical experiments on a realistic deployment
setting, showing that TEEKAP is able to handle access re-
quests at scale with sub-second latency.
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